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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the responsiveness of Spanish ACs (Autonomous Communities) fiscal 
policy to changes in the cyclical position as well as to other determinants such as institutional 
and political economy features. ACs fiscal policy is countercyclical despite surpluses in 
expansions do not offset deficits in downturns. However, we cannot infer an asymmetric 
reaction of Spanish ACs fiscal policy to the cycle. Results also suggest that as education and 
health were devolved ACs primary budget balance (PBB) worsened, which may be indicative of 
underfunded responsibilities. We also identify a significant effect of relative fiscal resources of 
ACs financing system on PBB, which should be taken into account as there have been great 
disparities. In addition, there is a strong inertial component in ACs PBB, and legislative fiscal 
rules and fiscal corresponsibility present a positive effect on PBB until the latest global financial 
crisis. Lastly, it should also be noted that the fiscal stance of ACs worsens the year before 
elections. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The stability of public finances throughout the economic cycle (the stabilisation function of the 
public sector) is a central question in the study of public economics, and it has been stressed 
after the recent international financial crisis. From an institutional point of view, there is an 
increasing relevance of stability in the context of The Stability and Growth Pact, which 
determines a rule-based framework for the coordination of national fiscal policies. However, 
sub-national fiscal policies have received much less attention in the literature. To the best of our 
knowledge only Claeys et alt (2008), Rodden & Wibbels (2010) and Argimón & Hernández de 
Cos (2012) have dealt empirically with fiscal reaction functions at regional level. Therefore, this 
work contributes in expanding the evidence around the reaction to the cycle of sub-national 
fiscal policies. 
 
The principal objective of this paper is to analyse the responsiveness of ACs (Autonomous 
Communities) fiscal policy to cyclical position2, as well as to other determinants such as 
institutional and political economy features. In the present situation, the striking deterioration of 
Spain’s fiscal position (as well as of the ACs) makes this area of research especially attractive. 
One of the main challenges is to test an asymmetric reaction of Spanish ACs fiscal policy to 
changes in the cyclical conditions. ACs fiscal policy may be countercyclical but surpluses in 
expansions may not offset deficits in downturns. As we shall see, the empirical evidence 
provides no clear support this hypothesis. Another contribution is the inclusion of a wide range 
of political economy and institutional variables. In this regard, we provide several institutional 
variables which have not been included in the literature when estimating fiscal reaction 
functions. For instance, we control for expenditure responsibilities, fiscal corresponsibility as 
well as relative fiscal resources.3 Results suggest that as education and health were devolved 
ACs primary budget balance (PBB) worsened, which may be indicative of underfunded 
responsibilities. Another interesting finding is that fiscal corresponsibility presents a positive 
effect on the PBB until the latest global financial crisis. As for relative fiscal resources we also 
identify a significant effect on PBB, which should be taken into account as there have been 
great disparities in terms of relative resources between ACs. 
 
The article is structured in six sections. After this introduction we discuss the institutional 
background in which the ACs develop their activity, and in particular fiscal decentralization 
issues as well as a brief summary of fiscal rules in Spain regarding debt and budget deficits. In 
                                                            
2 According to Galí, economic cycles can be defined as those recurrent fluctuations in the 
economic activity that affect the overall economy, and which are reflected in changes of growth 
rates of aggregated and recurrent variables but this does not mean that their periodicity remains 
constant. 
3 Argimón and Hernández de Cos (2012) included a proxy to fiscal corresponsibility which 
differs substantially from ours. We consider only revenues subject to change, while their 
indicator captures the proportion of tax revenues with respect to non financial revenues. 
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section 3 we review some empirical studies that have focused on fiscal policy rules. Next, we 
discuss data issues and summarize the evolution of debt and budget balance for the ACs. In 
section 5 we present panel data estimates of the primary budget balance reaction function. As 
determinants of the primary budget balance we test the change in cyclical position, political 
economy variables related to the institutional background of the ACs, a debt stabilization 
measure as well as the inertia in budgetary policy. We restricted our analysis to period 1987-
2010. Before 1987, the central government provided the funding of the transferred services 
according to the effective cost (the cost before decentralization) which included the direct and 
indirect costs, as well as investment outlays. Thus, we exclude of our analysis the previous 
period, as ACs had little incidence on the evolution of budget balances. Finally, section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
 
In the past 30 years Spain has moved from a highly centralized public sector to a distribution of 
revenues and expenditures similar to federal countries like Australia, Germany or Switzerland 
(see Molina and Mussons, 2010).4 The 1978 Spanish Constitution organises the present 
territorial structure into municipalities and provinces at the local level, and 17 autonomous 
communities (ACs) at the intermediate level and recognizes their autonomy to manage their 
own interests. The decentralization process in Spain has been very fast regarding expenditures, 
in contrast with the revenue side. Figure A1 reflects the Spanish territorial decentralization from 
the expenditure side.5 All the ACs have assumed responsibilities in fundamental areas of the 
welfare state such as education, health and social services. ACs represent one third of non 
financial public expenditures in Spain according to 2010 data (see Table A1). However, ACs non 
financial revenues are just below 20 % of the public sector (Table A2). Therefore, despite these 
institutional changes, vertical fiscal imbalance is still important at the intermediate level in Spain. 
It should be highlighted that dependence on central government transfers is generally 
associated with lower subnational fiscal performance (e.g. Rodden, 2002). 
  
This decentralization process is one of the main issues to bear in mind in order to ensure an 
appropriate evaluation of ACs budgetary policy. There are some asymmetries that should be 
noted for the Spanish case. On the one hand, there are two regimes with important differences 
regarding authority to raise taxes and regarding per capita public resources: the foral regime 
and the common regime. The Foral regime, which refers to the Basque Country and Navarra 
ACs, is characterised by a high level of fiscal autonomy, low interregional solidarity and a higher 
                                                            
4 Canada and United States could be also included in this group, but the intermediate level in 
these countries presents a higher relative weight concerning the distribution of non financial 
revenues. 
5 It should be taken into account that data represented in Figure A1 include financial 
expenditures, and therefore it differs from data presented in Table A1 which refers to non 
financial expenditures. 
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(per capita) public resources with respect to common system ACs. On the other hand, another 
fundamental asymmetry is related to the devolution process of spending responsibilities. There 
were a fast and a low path to assume the ACs responsibilities. The high responsibility regions 
(Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Valencian Community and Galicia) were responsible, in 
general, for health and education since the 80s. Instead, the rest of ACs completed the 
decentralization process in 2002. Health and education account for the largest part of the 
budget, representing 65.7 percent in 2007 of the total spent by ACs (Molina and Mussons, 
2010). Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that central government is also able to establish 
the basic legislation on these areas, and therefore it can condition ACs expenditure. 
 
Furthermore, among the Common regime we must point out the main changes in the regional 
financing agreements of our period of reference, as it conditions the responsiveness of ACs 
fiscal policy to cyclical conditions. There have been five financing agreements since 1987, that 
cover these periods: 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2008 and 2009- which is the 
current agreement in force. Along this period, ACs have been mainly financed through central 
government transfers. Initially the Common regime was characterized by having a fair amount of 
expenditure responsibility, but very little revenue autonomy. The regions in this regime were 
mainly financed by central government transfers until 2001. The 2001 agreement increased 
responsibility of the regions. It increased the number of ceded taxes as well as the tax power of 
the ACs in order to improve their fiscal responsibility. In fact, it pretended to be the definitive 
agreement but it could not cope with unexpected population increase which was uneven across 
regions. Finally, the current model, which has been applied since 2009, represents an 
improvement in terms of autonomy and financial sufficiency, at the same time as introducing 
explicit mechanisms of levelling and solidarity. Therefore, as fiscal autonomy has increased over 
the last 30 years we expect ACs to be more responsive to cyclical conditions. 
 
Another important issue to ensure an appropriate evaluation of ACs budgetary policy is the 
legislative fiscal rules in force at any time. In fact, budgetary activity of the ACs is limited by a 
group of fiscal rules that condition their performance, in particular, LOFCA (the Organic Law on 
the financing of ACs), Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios (BCS) as well as recent budgetary 
stability legislation. LOFCA distinguishes between short term credit operations, to cover 
transitional financial needs, and long term operations, that have to fulfil the following 
requirements: a) the total amount of the credit has to be devoted to fund investment expenses 
b) amortizations and interests cannot exceed of 25% of current revenues. Besides, the 
permission of the central government is necessary for external operations. 
 
The strong increase of regional debt in the early nineties and the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which establish some requirements regarding the sustainability of the public finances, 
are the origin of the BCS between the State and each AC. These scenarios fixed deficit and 
debt ceiling for each AC by means of bilateral negotiations. This frame of bilateral negotiation 
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takes place since 1992 until the year 2001. Despite some weaknesses of design and repeated 
breaches by some ACs, it is necessary to recognize that the BCS introduced the culture of 
budgetary stability and achieved to brake the increasing trend of regional debt. 
 
In 2001 it came into force a stability law with stringent legal requirements (i.e. annual 
equilibrium) as, in practical terms, it excluded debt as a source to fund investment expenses.  
Next, a reform of the Budgetary Stability Act was passed in 2006, which made more flexible the 
budgetary stability principle. This reform enabled central and regional government to adapt its 
fiscal stance to cyclical conditions. It enabled ACs to run a deficit of 0.75% of GDP if economic 
growth situates underneath a determinate threshold. Besides, under special circumstances, it 
was possible a 0.25% additional deficit to fund increases on productive investments. In addition, 
since 2002 it has been more common public-private partnerships to fund infrastructure funding. 
In fact, there are some authors, like Fernandez Llera (2011), who suggest that ACs have been 
using public sector enterprises and these public-private partnerships as a mechanism to elude 
legal restrictions on public deficit. 
 
3. Fiscal policy rules: an empirical review 
 
Our empirical analysis of the behaviour of fiscal policy over the cycle is based on the estimation 
of fiscal reaction functions where measures of the fiscal stance are regressed against a series 
of possible factors explaining the behaviour of fiscal authorities, notably the past level of deficit, 
debt and a measure of cyclical conditions. This is the main framework although the literature 
differs in the specification of these functions (see next box). Among other issues we highlight 
some elements that may guide our research. 
 
- Type of rule. Do we base our policy rule on the expectation of the output gap 
(forward-looking rule) or on the past values of the output gap (backward-looking rule)? 
The potential autocorrelation of budget decisions should also be considered, that is, by 
including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor (for instance, by specifying a 
partial-adjustment model). Non-linear issues related to debt and related to switching 
models are also interesting extensions to the baseline model. 
 
- Dependent variables. The choice of the dependent variable is not neutral. In fact 
there are various elements that might be addressed. Firstly, we should choose the 
specification in levels or in first differences. Secondly, it is also of great relevance to 
adjust (or not to adjust) the fiscal variables. If we cyclically adjust our data we are 
dealing with discretionary measures, whereas if we don’t adjust we are analysing the 
whole effect on fiscal policy (automatic as well as discretionary measures). In addition, it 
seems of particular interest to extend the analysis for revenues and expenditures, as 
they might show a different behaviour. 
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- Independent variables. The baseline model includes variables that capture the debt 
stabilisation motive (a test of the government solvency) as well as the output gap 
stabilization motive (a test of the government response to the cyclical conditions). “The 
choice of the output gap in levels focuses on whether the position of the economy is 
above or below its trend and on its distance from it, while the reference to growth 
measures focuses on whether the economy is in an upturn or in a downturn and its 
intensity” (Golinelli and Momigliano, 2008, p.4). 
 
Moreover, the role of monetary policy variables (e.g. a potential interaction with fiscal 
policy variables, see Claeys, 2005) as well as political economy issues may be 
considered. Argimon and Hernández de Cos (2012) build variables that capture “the 
number of members of parliament that can be associated with left-wing parties and pro-
autonomy parties over the total number of regional members of parliament”. The 
authors also consider “the level of political influence of the central parliament over the 
regional budget balance by constructing a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the party 
with more representation in the regional parliament is the same as the one with more 
representatives in the national parliament”. Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and 
Sorribas-Navarro (2011) also evaluated the fiscal behaviour of politically-aligned regions 
but as determinants of central government bailouts (where the dependent variable was 
discretionary or a priori non-discretionary grants). 
 
Concerning the so-called electoral-cycle models, Argimon and Hernández de Cos 
(2012) remark that these models “combine two basic features: a certain short-
sightedness among electors, who are not capable of clearly perceiving the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint (i.e., that the current deficit will 
necessarily have to be financed by future surpluses or that voters do not take future 
generations into consideration), and the motives of rulers that depart from the 
benevolence assumed in the initial theoretical models, so that the main objective of 
government action is reelection. One of the essential prescriptions of these models is 
growth of the budget deficit in the run-up to elections”. 
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Specification issues. Fiscal Policy Rules
Bohn (1998) Taylor (2001)
Ballabriga & Martinez-
Mongay (2002) Galí & Perotti (2003) Claeys (2005) Claeys (2008) Turrini (2008)
Golinelli & 
Momigliano (2009)
Argimón & 
Hernández de Cos 
(2012)
Type of rule
Fiscal / Monetary Policy Rules FPR FPR MPR / FPR FPR FPR FPR FPR FPR FPR
backward looking (BL) / forward 
looking (FL)
BL FL FL FL FL BL BL
Dynamic specification: no 
adjustment (NA) / partial 
NA NA PA PA PA PA PA 3 specifications 
(CAPB; CAPB/PB 
PA
non-linear specification deficit and debt targets
Markov switching model 
(debt and surplus, 2 
regimes)
Period 1916-1995 1960.1 - 1999.3 1979-1998 1980-2002 1970.1-2006.4 1980-2005 1988-2006 1984-2004
Territorial scope US US
EMU + Denmark, 
Sweden and UK EMU, EU3 + OECD5
forme EMS countries + 
Japan and USA
Sweden + small open 
economies (Finland, 
Norway, Denmark and 
Netherlands)
EU11 11 EMU countries Spanish AC
Descriptive analysis
primary surplus (and 
adjusted surplus) 
vs. initial debt
actual versus target 
rates
actual versus target 
primary surplus
deficit / gdp [mean]
debt / gdp [mean]
cumulative change in 
structural deficit / 
change in og [over the 
recession periods]
debt / GDP; primary 
surplus vs output gap 
and interest rates vs 
inflation
debt / GDP; surplus / 
GDP and output gap; 
spending and revenue 
ratio to GDP
change in CAPB / CA 
revenues / CA 
expenditures vs OG;
in good / bad times;
change in CAPB 1980-
1991, 1992-1998, 1999-
2005
size of subsamples 
across data sources, 
in good and bad 
times (extensions to 
the core model)
Dependent variable primary budget surplus / GDP
(structural / cyclical / 
total surplus ) / GDP
primary surplus / GDP normalized by potential 
output
primary surplus / 
potential GDP
primary surplus / GDP; 
surplus / GDP ; primary 
surplus / potential GDP
change in the CAPB change in the CAPB 
/ PB
budget balance in 
cash terms
- level / 1st differences (L / 1dif) L L L L L L 1dif 1dif L / 1dif
- cyclically adjusted (CA) / non 
cyclicacly adjusted (NCA) NCA CA / NCA CA / NCA CA NCA / CA NCA CA CA / NA NCA
- separate analysis for revenues and 
expenditure YES YES
YES + fiscal rules for 
spending items YES
Independent variables
- debt stabilization motive 
(government solvency)
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
debt / GDP debt / GDP debt / potential GDP debt and squared debt 
ratio
rule with debt policy 
shift
debt EDP debt / GDP
- output gap stabilization motive YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ratio of actual to 
potential GDP
(real - potential GDP) 
/ potential GDP
og as % of potential 
output
(real - potential GDP) / 
potential GDP og OECD og OECD og(-1) og and og(-1) real gdp growth
- interaction with monetary policy
YES; correlation 
between residuals of 
estimated policy rules
YES; introduction of the 
deviation from a Taylor 
rule interest rate
YES; interest rates and 
response to inflation 
deviations from target
YES
YES; real interest 
rates
- political economy variables
weak / strong expenditure 
rules
parliamentary elections
YES; regular and 
snap elections
YES; political 
variables, indicator of 
fiscal 
corresponsibility, 
partisan alignement
- others
temporary 
government 
spending (see 
Barro, 1986)
dummie before and after 
Maastricht
US output gap (rather than 
including time dummies)
og dummies
dummies after 1992 / 
1999
comparision between 
diferent data sources
dummies for fiscal 
rules, financing 
autonomous 
agreement
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Specification issues. Fiscal Policy Rules
Bohn (1998) Taylor (2001)
Ballabriga & Martinez-
Mongay (2002) Galí & Perotti (2003) Claeys (2005) Claeys (2008) Turrini (2008)
Golinelli & 
Momigliano (2009)
Argimón & 
Hernández de Cos 
(2012)
Robustness analysis
- alternatives measures of OG
measures of real 
marginal costs (Galí et 
l 2001)
real time data
- stability analysis YES YES
Andrews Quandt 
breakdates in target 
fiscal policy rule
recursive Andrews 
Quandt LR test 
statistics for stability of 
fiscal rule
good / bad times
good / bad times; 
estimates in rolling 
samples;
Method of estimation OLS OLS
GMM
instruments: one lag, 
short run interest rates 
in fp rule equation, 
effective real exchange 
rate and a commodity 
price indicator
IV
instrument og: one lag 
and the lagged value of 
the US output gap (the 
lagged EU15 og for the 
US)
GMM
GMM; instrument: lags 
of the og and debt, unit 
labour costs, growth in 
labour productivity and 
the NAIRU, broad 
money aggregate and 
international monetary 
conditions
OLS / GMM /  IV / probit 
regression
instrument: own lag and 
the lag of a measure of 
foreign og on the basis of 
export shares towards the 
biggest three export 
markets
GMM-sys; 
instruments: t-2 and t-
3 lags of the debt, og 
and primary balance
GMM using as 
instruments 
regressors lagged 
two periods.
Panel approach YES; country fixed effects
YES; country fixed effects YES; country fixed 
effects; time effects
YES
Others
nonlinearities in the 
surplus-debt 
relationship
CABD equation is not 
considered a policy 
instrument of fiscal 
authorities
rolling 5-year window of 
the volatility of the fiscal 
policy shock
debt stabilising surplus
fp pro-cyclicality at the 
margin / on average / pro-
cyclical bias of fp / risk of 
pro-cyclicality
 2-sample approach 
and 2-parameter 
approach when 
testing for fiscal 
asymmetries
Results
US fiscal policy is 
satisfying an 
intertemporal budget 
constraint
countercyclical fiscal 
policy should focus 
on the automatic 
stabilizers rather 
than discretionary 
actions; discretionary 
fiscal policy should 
focus on long run 
issues such as tax 
reform and social 
security reform
monetary dominance 
regime in pre-EMU 
and EMU economic 
policy although non-
systematic fp appears 
as a more active 
policy tool than non-
systematic mp; Spain 
weaker response to 
the og
after EMU less 
procyclicality although 
EMU countries had 
experienced (till 2003) 
few real recessions 
during the post-
Maastricht period
there is substancial 
interaction between fiscal 
and monetary policy via 
the debt channel. 
Sustainability is achieved 
with a stop-go cycle of 
consolidation. 
Consolidation does not 
come at the cost of less 
cyclical stabilisation 
unless debt ratios are 
high
spending increases 
have greatly contributed 
to the explosion of debt; 
distintion between 
periods of debt 
explosion and 
consolidation
expansionary bias of 
expenditure in good times;
expost og were much 
more closely correlated 
with capacity utilisation 
rates than with real-time 
og
Ex post data suggest 
either a-cyclicality or 
weak counter-
cyclicality. Real-time 
information gives 
clearer indications of 
counter-cyclical 
behaviour. As for 
asymmetry, it 
depends on the 
sources of data and 
periods. Whenever is 
present it entails 
shifts in all the 
parameters of the 
fiscal rule
A higher level of 
fiscal autonomy 
leads to a more 
disciplined behaviour 
by ACs. Increasing 
dependency of fiscal 
performance on the 
economic cycle. 
Strong inertial 
component in the 
implementation of AC 
fiscal policy.
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- Robustness analysis. It is a central issue in these studies to assess the robustness 
of the main results. Accordingly, it is interesting to account for alternative measures of 
the output gap (for instance, real time data in case it is available), a stability analysis as 
well as comparing results using different data sources (see Golinelli and Momigliano, 
2009). 
 
- Method of estimation. If we consider that fiscal policy could have real effects (that is, 
it is endogenous) we should use instrumental variables or GMM methods. However, if 
we consider that fiscal policy is exogenous we could use OLS. Besides, it seems 
interesting to assess differences between single equation and panel data results. In the 
present case, we estimate our fiscal reaction functions using instrumental variables (and 
also using OLS to check the main differences). As an instrument, we take the output 
gap of the biggest five Spanish export market weighted by its exports shares, in line with 
Galí and Perotti (2003) empirical strategy. 
 
4. Data 
 
Before the econometric analysis we provide some remarks concerning our dependent variable 
in the econometric analysis (i.e. primary budget balance) and related to the co-movement 
between cyclical conditions and primary budget balance. Appendix A2 provides some 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the following section and Appendix A3 deals with 
the definition of the variables and the data sources. 
 
To start with, primary budget balance of each AC is computed according to budgetary criteria 
both regarding to the institutional scope covered as well as to the accounting rules. On the one 
hand, this data relates to all the public units included in the consolidated budget of each AC. On 
the other hand, the use of budgetary accounting criteria differs with National Accounts 
methodology. A scatter plot (see Figure A3) immediately reveals a high correlation and it also 
highlights more deficitary values of national accounts data in relation to budgetary data. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, budgetary data allows us to analyse 1987-2010 period 
whereas national account data adapted to ACs is available only since 2003 (to the best of our 
knowledge). These issues will be discussed in turn. 
 
Then, our focus turns to the co-movement between cyclical conditions and primary budget 
balance, i.e., our dependent variable. In this article, cyclical conditions are captured by changes 
in regional unemployment gap (ug) or by changes in regional output gap (og). On the one hand, 
unemployment gap is obtained as the deviation of observed unemployment rate from the mean 
of this rate for the period 1977-2011. On the other hand, output gap refers to the deviation of 
real GDP from the trend, which is estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with lambda 
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100. Homogeneous series of gross valued added at constant prices, constructed by de la 
Fuente (2010), are used in order to overcome statistical problems related to statistical 
methodological changes of national accounts bases. In addition, we use official forecasts for the 
Spanish economy until 2016 (from European Commission and International Monetary Fund), in 
order to minimize the end-point bias related to HP filter. Figure A2 provides compelling evidence 
of a failure of HP filter to capture the intensity of the most recent crisis. Instead, unemployment 
gap properly captures the key features of Spanish economic cycle. 
 
The model fit to data is much better in first differences than in levels. This result is probably 
related to the great dependence of ACs financial resources to the evolution of real-state sector, 
which may be more responsive to growth measures. As mentioned above, the choice of the 
cyclical position in levels focuses on whether the position of the economy is above or below its 
trend and on its distance from it, while the reference to growth measures focuses on whether 
the economy is in an upturn or in a downturn and its intensity.  
 
According to changes in the unemployment gap we can identify different subperiods; two upturn 
periods (1987-1990 and 1995-2007) and two downturn periods (1991-1994 and 2008-2010). 
For each AC and subperiod, we compute the mean of the changes in the unemployment gap 
and the mean of the primary budget balance as a share of GDP. These statistics are shown in 
Table A7, which also reports the ratio between both variables. The latter ratio can be interpreted 
as a simple statistic that captures the sign and intensity of the discretionary fiscal response. 
Thus, a negative (positive) sign for the ratio indicates countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal stance, 
whereas the size of the ratio captures the strength of that response.6 According to this ratio ACs 
fiscal policy has been, in general terms, increasingly countercyclical. Nevertheless, we should 
make some cautionary remarks. Despite ACs fiscal policy has been countercyclical, the size of 
ACs budget surpluses during the last cyclical upturn was not enough to avoid pro-cyclicality 
stance at present, i.e., 2012. In order to check this result, we obtained the correlation coefficient 
between primary budget balance and changes in the unemployment gap (-0.43). This estimate 
confirms countercyclicallity, as PBB is positive (negative) in upturns (downturns). The following 
section examines the determinants of AC primary budget balances, with special attention given 
to the sensitivity of primary budget balance to changes in cyclical conditions. 
 
5. Evidence from the estimation of fiscal reaction functions for ACs 
 
In this section we deal with the econometric estimation of fiscal reaction functions for ACs, that 
is, we attempt to control the main factors that affect their fiscal stance. In other words, we isolate 
the impact of factors that have an influence on the stance of ACs fiscal policy. Our baseline 
specification (A1) takes the primary balance to GDP ratio (pbb) of each AC as the policy 
                                                            
6 This approach is similar to Galí and Perotti (2003). 
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instrument and set its target for that instrument as a function of changes in the unemployment 
gap (d (ug)), the lagged dependent variable, an index of expenditure responsibilities (ires) and 
an electoral cycle variable (ecycle). We do not include debt (debt) in our baseline specification 
as data is only available from 1992.   
 
In some specifications (A2) we allow for asymmetric reactions to the cycle, by including two 
variables which capture the change in the unemployment gap in upturns (d(ug) negative) and 
downturns (d(ug) positive). Other extensions (A3) of this fiscal rule are also considered, by 
including institutional and political economy variables. Concerning political economy variables, 
we should distinguish between variables related to the incumbents and the incidence of the 
institutional framework.  
 
(A1) ititecycleitiresitpbbitogconstit uECYCLEIRESPBBUGPBB ++++Δ+= −− 11 φφφφφ  
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Ideology of the incumbents is a significant factor that lies behind primary budget balance 
determinants. We address this factor by two means: first, in terms of the number of seats 
corresponding to the concerned ideology (% of left-wing seats and % of nationalist seats), 
and second, we capture the ideology of the incumbent president with a dummy (left-wing 
president and nationalist president).7 In addition, we include a political alignment variable 
(aligned) indicating if the incumbent party (or the party leading the incumbent coalition) in the 
regional government is the same as the incumbent party in the central government (or the party 
leading the incumbent coalition). 
 
The incidence of the institutional framework is complex, especially in Spain with its 
decentralized government. Therefore we have included a wide range of variables to capture 
variation in AC responsibilities (index of expenditure responsibilities, which tracks the  
increase in regional expenditures needs due to the assignment of the provision of health and/or 
                                                            
7 The effect of a single dummy independent variable is equivalent to an intercept shift. So the 
three independent political party variables measure the difference in terms of primary budget 
balance between the variable concerned and the benchmark group (PP). The base or 
benchmark group is governments where its president belong to right-wing parties which are not 
nationalists, i.e., to Partido Popular. 
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education)8, fiscal corresponsibility (fiscal corresponsibility 1997-2001 and fiscal 
corresponsibility 2002-2010, which captures the % of AC fiscal resources subject to change)9, 
relative resources from the autonomous financing system (index of relative fiscal resources),  
legislative fiscal rules (Budget Consolidation Scenarios, a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 in the period 1992-2001; Budget Stability Act 2001, a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 in the period 2002-2006; and Budget Stability Act 2006, a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 in the period 2007-2010), foral ACs (foral AC takes a value of 1 for the Chartered 
Community of Navarra and the Basque Country) and uniprovincial ACs (uniprovincial AC takes 
a value of 1 for the Community of Madrid, the Chartered Community of Navarra, Balearic 
Islands, La Rioja, Cantabria, the Principality of Asturias and the Region of Murcia).10 Ultimately, 
these institutional features could condition the ACs fiscal reaction to the cycle. Before 
presenting our empirical specifications we remind that Appendix A3 provides a detailed 
definition of the mentioned variables and their corresponding data sources. 
 
The estimation method used is seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner, 1962), which 
considers the possibility that the error terms may be correlated across the equations of the 
system.11 This system consists of all the ACs. For instance, we might expect that a central 
government measure which affects the primary budget balance in one AC would simultaneously 
affect the primary budget balance in other ACs as well. According to Davidson and Mackinnon 
(2004, p. 502), to allow for this possibility, the assumption that is usually made about the error 
terms in the model is: 
 
ijjtit uuE σ=),( for all t, 0),( =jsit uuE  for all st ≠  
 
In addition, it is necessary to bear in mind that fiscal policy could have real effects, and 
accordingly unemployment gap may be endogenous. In other words, fiscal policy does not only 
react to the cycle but it can also influence it. Therefore, we also estimate our fiscal reaction 
functions using instrumental variables. In line with Galí and Perotti (2003) we need to instrument 
the unemployment gap of each AC with that of another country (or group of countries) with 
which it is likely to be correlated for reasons other than the existence of coordinated fiscal 
policies. So, we take as an instrument the output gap of the biggest five Spanish export markets 
                                                            
8 The index of expenditure responsibilities is defined following Sorribas (2011). See Appendix 
A3. 
9 The fiscal corresponsibility indicator is splitted into two variables which take the value of the 
mentioned indicator for the corresponding period (1997-2001 and 2002-2010), and 0 otherwise. 
This separation is necessary as changes in expenditure responsibilities make this indicator not 
homogenous across the sample. 
10 In these uniprovincial ACs, the regional government also assumes the functions of provincial 
local governments. 
11 Cross-section fixed effects are also included. 
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weighted by its exports shares. This variable is much less volatile than Spanish unemployment 
gap as we can see in the Figure A2. 
 
We also take into account the strong inertia related to policy processes. As Ballabriga and 
Martínez-Mongay (2002, p.9) states “inertia is to a large extent explained by the political 
difficulty of changing past spending commitments and carrying out regular and recurrent drastic 
adjustments in tax codes”.  Hence, we include the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. 
 
Dependent variable: Primary budget balance / GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant term 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.91) (-0.32) (4.8)*** (-0.69) (2.91)*** (3.4)*** (-6.18)*** (-6.25)*** (-6.45)*** (-4.93)***
d (ug) -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 -0.18 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14
(-15.56)*** (-12.72)*** (-9.52)*** (-13.46)*** (-8.51)*** (-6.88)*** (-5.04)*** (-5.82)***
d (ug) positive -0.16 -0.15
(-14.00)*** (-3.73)***
d (ug) negative -0.04 -0.22
(-3.78)*** (-2.57)**
d(ug) * foral AC -0.92
(-8.33)***
d(ug) * uniprovincial AC 0.15
(9.7)***
d(ug) * left-wing president -0.03
(-2.03)**
Primary Budget Balance
/ GDP (-1) 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.54 0.51 0.43 0.54 0.37
(16.6)*** (17.08)*** (16.46)*** (15.31)*** (11.92)*** (29.1)*** (16.66)*** (13.22)*** (14.54)*** (9.25)***
Index of expenditure responsibilities
(x 1000) -1.39 -1.03 -1.61 -0.84 -1.63 -2.13 -0.68 -3.00 -1.13 -1.50
(-7.26)*** (-5.85)*** (-8.67)*** (-2.58)** (-6.28)*** (-15.36)*** (-2.47)** (-7.03)*** (-2.69)*** (-4.26)***
Electoral Cycle (-1) (dummy) (x1000) -0.62 -0.55 -0.72 -0.39 -0.94 -1.15 -0.60 -0.53 -0.84 -0.98
(-2.98)*** (-2.68)*** (-3.55)*** (-1.43) (-3.67)*** (-6.65)*** (-2.49)** (-1.92)* (-3.18)*** (-3.22)***
Aligned  (dummy) (x1000) -0.19 -0.51
(-0.75) (-1.74)*
Debt (-1) -0.01
(-0.75)
% of left-wing seats (x1000) 1.45 2.18 2.99 -2.35
(0.49) (0.64) (0.92) (-0.64)
% of nationalist seats (x1000) 18.53 14.00 22.18 26.40
(4.69)*** (3.54)*** (4.7)*** (5.67)***
Nationalist president (dummy) (x1000) -1.69
(-4.52)***
Left-wing president (dummy) (x1000) -1.05
(-2.22)**
Fiscal corresponsibility 1987-2001 (x1000) -1.21 -0.62
(-1.81)* (-0.97)
Fiscal corresponsibility 2002- (x1000) -0.19 7.04
(-0.12) (5.47)***
Index of relative fiscal resources (x1000) 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
(4.92)*** (5.54)*** (5.36)*** (4.56)***
Budget Consolidation Scenarios
(dummy) (X1000) 3.00
(3.7)***
Budget Stability Act 2001
(dummy) (X1000) 7.90
(6.67)***
Budget Stability Act 2006
(dummy) (X1000) -0.35
(-0.25)
Number of observations 408 408 408 408 408 306 408 408 360 330
Sample 1987-20101987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1993-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2008
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.77 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.94 0.75 0.80 0.68 0.60
Estimation method OLS IV OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Redundant fixed effects test
Cross-section F (p-value)
2.68
(0.00)
3.86
(0.00)
Hausman exogeneity test
Chi2 (5)  (p-value)
10.39
(0.06)
127.35
(0.00)
Shea partial R2
d (ug) 0.34
d (ug) positive 0.08
d (ug) negative 0.01
Notes: all regressions are estimated by Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR weights). Cross-section fixed effects are included.
*** signification at 99% & ** 95% & * 90%. t-statistics are reported between parentheses.
Shea R-square above 0.10 is generally regarded as support of predictive power.
Output gap of the biggest 5 Spanish export markets - weighted by their export shares- is used as an instrument of ACs unemployment gap.
all ACs common regime ACs
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The main results are discussed below. First, ACs fiscal policy has been countercyclical as we 
have measured the cyclical conditions, that is, in first differences. This result is similar to 
Argimon and Hernández de Cos (2012), but contrasts with Rodden and Wibbels (2010) who 
analyse sub-national fiscal policies for seven federations. Endogeneity of cyclical conditions has 
been checked with Hausman test and, as we reject the null hypothesis, we instrument the 
unemployment gap of each AC. Regarding instrument weakness we provide the partial Shea-
Godfrey R-squared. We computed the latter statistic according to Godfrey procedure (1999), 
and results do not indicate weakness of our instrumental variables. 
 
Overall, ACs fiscal policy is countercyclical as primary budget balance reaction to changes in 
the unemployment gap is negative. When asymmetries are allowed we cannot infer an 
asymmetric reaction of Spanish ACs fiscal policy to the cycle (see specifications 3 and 4).12 
 
In connection with cyclical sensitivity we have also tested if the reaction to the cycle differs 
depending on AC political and institutional status (see specification 8). Therefore, we have 
interacted dummy variables with changes in the unemployment gap to allow for differences in 
slopes. The results suggest that foral ACs and left-wing governments are more responsible to 
changes in cyclical conditions; in fact, their fiscal behavior is more countercyclical. Conversely, 
uniprovincial AC exhibit a more procyclical pattern. 
 
Concerning political economy variables, as we have previously stated, we should distinguish 
between the effect of variables related to the incumbents and the incidence of the institutional 
framework. Ideology of the incumbents is a significant factor that lies behind primary budget 
balance determinants. Nationalist parties present a more prudent fiscal policy than right-wing 
non nationalist parties (PP) according to the % of seats, but when considering president 
ideology the opposite result was found. Left-wing governments present an ambiguous pattern 
as their response also differs depending on the definition used. President ideology indicates a 
negative correlation with respect to right-wing non nationalist parties, whereas proportion of left-
wing seats in the parliament does not present a significant effect. Another interesting finding is 
the growth of the budget deficit just before elections, in line with electoral-cycle hypothesis. 
However, it must be remarked that this variable is only significant when using one lag. This 
means that the fiscal stance of ACs worsens the year before the elections. Lastly, we do not find 
robust evidence regarding the effect of political alignment on ACs primary budget balance. 
 
The incidence of the institutional framework is complex, especially in Spain with its 
decentralized government. Therefore we have included a wide range of variables to capture 
                                                            
12 We have estimated again our specifications with ACs output gap as the cyclical conditions 
variable. (see Table A8). Results are very similar, although we found an asymmetric reaction to 
the cycle. Nevertheless, the failure of HP filter to capture the intensity of the most recent crisis 
(see Figure A2) does not enable us to infer valid conclusions from Table A8. 
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variation in AC responsibilities, fiscal corresponsibility, relative resources from the autonomous 
financing system and fiscal rules.13 First, as AC had more responsibilities (that is, when 
education and health responsibilities were devolved) their accounts presented a worse fiscal 
stance. This result is captured by the negative expenditure responsibility index coefficient. 
 
Second, fiscal corresponsibility, measured as the proportion of ACs Funding System resources 
which can be changed, presents different results according to the period under consideration. 
These estimates refer only to the subset of ACs belonging to the common regime, as our fiscal 
corresponsibility indicator does not capture properly the higher fiscal corresponsibility of “foral 
territories”. Turning to results, we observe a mild negative reaction of this indicator with respect 
to ACs primary budget balance for the period 1997-2001.14 This result may be related to a lower 
fiscal corresponsibility of common regime ACs until 2001. The 2001 and 2009 ACs fiscal 
agreements increased their corresponsibility. It increased the number of ceded taxes as well as 
the tax power of the ACs in order to improve their fiscal responsibility. In fact, we obtain a 
positive association for the period 2002-2008, although we get a non-significant effect when we 
include the last two observations (2009 and 2010). In this regard, we should be cautious with 
this result as last observations are extremely influential on the estimated coefficient for fiscal 
corresponsibility index, which increases in 2009 as a result of the last AC financial arrangement. 
Third, we have also introduced in the fiscal reaction function the relative resources of the 
autonomous financing system. This variable is significant, indicating that more financial 
resources lead to a better fiscal stance. However, foral regime variable loses its significance 
when introducing this variable. We should bear in mind that there has been a great disparity in 
the relative resources among AC. A first disparity is between the foral and the common systems. 
In this regard, Zubiri (2011, p. 112) states that “the Basque Country and Navarre obtain about 
50% more per capita resources than the average Common Regime”. In second place, among 
the common system there are also significant differences in per capita financing. Furthermore, 
concerning institutional framework, we must turn to fiscal rules, which have improved 
significantly the primary budget balances until 2006, as we can appreciate in specification (9). 
Therefore, in terms of budgetary stability we can provide a positive assessment of the 
Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios (1992-2001) as well as of the Budgetary Stability Law 
approved in 2001, in contrast with the reform passed in 2006 which does not take a significant 
value. 
 
The results also show that there is a great inertia in the budgetary process, as the lagged 
dependent variable is very significant, with an estimated coefficient around 0.51. This inertia has 
recently increased as a result of the last international financial crisis. In this regard, estimations 
                                                            
13 At this point we must acknowledge the collaboration of the General Directorate of Economic 
Affairs (Generalitat de Catalunya), and in particular of M. Bassols. 
14 However, this variable (fiscal corresponsibility 1987-2001) loses its significance when we 
restrict our estimation sample to 1987-2008. 
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of the baseline specification until 2004 lead to an estimated coefficient of 0.42, in line with 
Argimón and Hernández de Cos (2012) estimates. 
 
Finally, with regard to responses to debt accumulation we do not obtain the expected sign. A 
positive reaction of primary surpluses to debt accumulation would guarantee fiscal solvency. 
However, budgetary data does not reveal a significant reaction to high levels of indebtedness. In 
addition, as we have mentioned below (in section 4), ACs primary budget balance (PBB) 
according to national accounting criteria is generally more negative. Then, when we estimate 
our fiscal reaction function (see next box) with national accounts data, which only cover 2003-
2010, an unsustainable pattern is displayed: a negative reaction of PBB to debt accumulation. 
Besides, this systematic pattern may have strengthened in recent times, as more indebted ACs 
have run larger budget deficits. Thus, this upward trend in government indebtedness is one of 
the challenges that deserve further attention in the near future.  
 
Dependent variable: Primary budget balance / GDP
all ACs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant term -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
(-6.94)*** (-6.77)*** (0.7) (0.66) (-0.76) (-0.74) (0.46) (0.47)
d (ug) -0,19 -0,17 -0,20 -0,19142 -0,15 -0,15 -0,15 -0,15282
(-6.2)*** (-4.11)*** (-7.04)*** (-5.12)*** (-6.56)*** (-4.91)*** (-6.58)*** (-5.01)***
Primary Budget Balance
/ GDP (-1) 0,70 0,72 0,65 0,66 0,85 0,85 0,83 0,83
(8.3)*** (7.8)*** (8.16)*** (7.74)*** (11.63)*** (10.96)*** (11.23)*** (10.53)***
Electoral Cycle (-1) (dummy) (x1000) -2,19 -2,27 -2,56 -2,59 -2,91 0,00 0,00 0,00
(-1.43) (-1.48) (-1.75)* (-1.76)* (-2.29)** (-2.29)** (-2.35)** (-2.35)**
Debt (-1) -0,12 -0,12 -0,02 -0,02
(-4.76)*** (-4.77)*** (-0.89) (-0.9)
Number of observations 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
Sample 2003-20102003-2010 2003-2010 2003-2010 2003-2010 2003-2010 2003-2010 2003-2010
Adjusted R2 0,59 0,59 0,65 0,65 0,68 0,68 0,68 0,68
Estimation method OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Notes: all regressions are estimated by Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights).
*** signification at 99% & ** 95% & * 90%. t-statistics are reported between parentheses.
Output gap of the biggest 5 Spanish export markets - weighted by their export shares- is used as an instrument of ACs unemployment gap.
national accounts data budgetary data
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
One of the main objectives of this paper is to analyse the responsiveness of ACs (Autonomous 
Communities) fiscal policy to the cyclical position of regional government. Overall, ACs fiscal 
policy is countercyclical as primary budget balance reaction to changes in the unemployment 
gap is negative. In addition, we cannot infer an asymmetric reaction of Spanish ACs fiscal policy 
to the cycle.  
 
To ensure an adequate evaluation of the fiscal position of ACs we also deal with other key 
determinants that make up our fiscal reaction functions: institutional features related to the 
Spanish decentralization process, legislative fiscal rules, political economy variables and 
responses to debt accumulation. In connection with institutional features we provide several 
variables which have not been included in the literature when estimating fiscal reaction 
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functions (to the best of our knowledge). For instance, we control for expenditure 
responsibilities, fiscal corresponsibility as well as relative fiscal resources. Results suggest that 
as education and health were devolved ACs primary budget balance (PBB) worsened, which 
may be indicative of underfunded responsibilities. As for relative fiscal resources we also 
identify a significant effect on PBB, which should be taken into account as there have been 
great disparities in terms of relative resources between ACs. Therefore the next revision of ACs 
financing system (envisaged for 2014) should evaluate the current distribution of public 
resources to ensure horizontal (between ACs) and vertical equity (between levels of 
government). 
  
Another interesting finding is that fiscal corresponsibility presents a positive effect on the PBB 
until the latest global financial crisis. We would note at this point that the uneven 
decentralization process in Spain –when regarding both the revenue and the expenditure side- 
may have not fostered a fiscally responsible behavior among ACs. This situation is becoming 
increasingly evident with the striking deterioration of regional public finances. Accordingly, ACs 
fiscal behaviour may improve by increasing revenue autonomy and decreasing dependence on 
central government transfers and tax sharing (as is the case of VAT and excise taxes). 
 
Legislative fiscal rules have been also a key determinant of ACs fiscal position. These rules 
have improved significantly the primary budget balances of the ACs until 2006, that is, the 
Budget Consolidation Scenarios (in force between 1992 and 2001) and the Budget Stability Act 
passed in 2001 (in force between 2002 and 2006). Instead, the Budget Stabilty Act approved in 
2006 could not cope with the recent deterioration of regional public finances. This field deserves 
further attention, and in particular it seems very interesting to monitor the incidence on all levels 
of government of the recent organic law on budgetary stability and financial sustainability of 
public administrations. 
  
Political economy variables offer some interesting results, which are ambiguous in some fields. 
To start with solid results we found that the fiscal stance of ACs worsens the year before the 
elections, in line with the electoral-cycle hypothesis. We also find that foral ACs have been more 
responsible to changes in cyclical conditions. Regarding ideology of incumbents we obtained 
mixed results. Nationalist parties present a more prudent fiscal policy than right-wing non 
nationalist parties (PP) according to the % of seats, but when considering president ideology the 
opposite result was found. Furthermore, left-wing governments present an ambiguous pattern 
as their response differs depending on the definition used. In addition, we do not find clear 
evidence as for the effect of political alignment on ACs PBB. After all, it seems advisable to 
design a fiscal policy rule for ACs which guarantees fiscal sustainability, regardless of political 
economy issues. As for the degree of countercyclicality, it is not a technical issue but political, as 
long as it does not jeopardize the sustainability of public finances. 
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Lastly, concerning debt accumulation our estimates indicate that ACs fiscal adjustment do not  
guarantee fiscal sustainability. This systematic pattern may have strengthened in recent times 
as more indebted ACs have run larger budget deficits. Thus, this upward trend in government 
indebtedness is one of the challenges that deserve further attention in the near future. 
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A2. Descriptive analysis 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of  public expenditures by levels of government*
% of total
* total expenditures (including financial expenditures).
Source: Informe económico-financiero de les administraciones territoriales. 
Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.
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% of total
Central 
government
Social 
Security
Regional 
goverment
Local 
government
2001 24.8 29.3 33.0 12.8
2002 24.4 30.3 32.3 13.1
2003 23.5 29.2 34.0 13.3
2004 24.4 28.8 34.2 12.5
2005 22.4 28.8 35.7 13.0
2006 22.2 28.5 35.9 13.4
2007 21.7 28.3 35.9 14.1
2008 21.4 28.6 36.4 13.6
2009 20.7 29.7 35.7 13.8
2010 20.4 31.6 34.6 13.4
Table A1. Distribution of non financial public expenditures by levels 
of government
Source: Actuación económica y financiera de las administraciones 
públicas (2005). Avance de la actuación económica y financiera de las 
administraciones públicas (2009 and 2010). IGAE. Spanish Ministry of 
Finance and Public Administration.  
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% of total
Central 
government
Social 
Security
Regional 
goverment
Local 
government
2001 48.7 31.5 9.5 10.3
2002 39.5 31.1 19.3 10.1
2003 37.7 31.3 21.2 9.8
2004 36.6 31.0 22.2 10.2
2005 36.9 30.2 22.6 10.3
2006 37.5 29.7 22.5 10.3
2007 38.5 29.4 21.8 10.2
2008 33.5 33.0 22.8 10.7
2009 29.8 34.9 24.2 11.1
2010 36.6 33.4 19.1 10.9
Table A2. Distribution of non financial public revenues by levels of 
government
Source: Actuación económica y financiera de las administraciones 
públicas (2005). Avance de la actuación económica y financiera de las 
administraciones públicas (2009 and 2010). IGAE. Spanish Ministry of 
Finance and Public Administration.  
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics
Sample: 1987 2010
Mean by AC
primary bb / 
gdp og dog ug dug og_ue5 dog_ue5 debt* foral uni
and -0,07 0,76 0,17 0,79 -0,04 -0,06 -0,03 7,2 0 0
ara -0,29 0,68 0,17 -0,47 0,00 -0,06 -0,03 4,7 0 0
ast -0,16 0,35 0,14 0,62 -0,03 -0,06 -0,03 4,2 0 100
bal -0,41 0,48 0,06 0,02 0,28 -0,06 -0,03 5,3 0 100
can -0,13 0,52 0,07 0,13 0,17 -0,06 -0,03 4,3 0 0
cant 0,06 0,52 0,14 0,97 -0,11 -0,06 -0,03 4,0 0 100
cat -0,25 0,64 0,19 -0,66 -0,14 -0,06 -0,03 8,6 0 0
cll -0,12 0,64 0,15 0,70 -0,05 -0,06 -0,03 3,6 0 0
clm -0,57 0,87 0,19 0,18 0,29 -0,06 -0,03 4,5 0 0
ext 0,07 0,87 0,20 0,84 -0,08 -0,06 -0,03 5,9 0 0
gal -0,14 0,55 0,20 1,54 0,11 -0,06 -0,03 8,3 0 0
mad 0,03 0,67 0,17 -0,75 -0,07 -0,06 -0,03 5,0 0 100
mur -0,10 0,84 0,15 0,58 0,18 -0,06 -0,03 4,4 0 100
nav 0,20 0,59 0,12 -0,96 -0,23 -0,06 -0,03 6,4 100 100
pb 0,22 0,65 0,14 0,69 0,02 -0,06 -0,03 4,6 100 0
rio -0,34 0,55 0,14 -0,08 -0,02 -0,06 -0,03 3,8 0 100
val -0,32 0,71 0,13 0,36 0,18 -0,06 -0,03 9,7 0 0
mean (unw eighted) -0,14 0,64 0,15 0,26 0,03 -0,06 -0,03 5,5 12 41
median 0,04 0,21 0,22 0,28 -0,37 1,05 0,15 4,80 0,00 0,00
maximum 4,76 7,41 4,74 10,82 9,13 2,74 1,06 18,60 100,00 100,00
minimum -5,39 -4,95 -6,51 -10,08 -4,91 -5,42 -1,96 1,00 0,00 0,00
std. dev. 1,08 2,50 1,91 4,14 2,21 2,45 0,76 2,70 32,26 49,28
skew ness -0,90 0,39 -0,65 0,05 1,23 -0,78 -0,77 1,41 2,37 0,36
kurtosis 7,25 2,46 3,79 2,23 5,23 2,29 2,92 5,96 6,63 1,13
jarque-bera 361,52 15,56 39,64 10,26 187,40 49,77 40,77 224,93 607,49 68,28
probability 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
* Sample: 1992-2010.
Notes: bb (budget balance); og (output gap); dog (f irst dif ference of og); ug (unemployment gap); dug (f irst dif ference of ug); uni (uniprovincial).  
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Table A4. Descripte statistics. Political economy and institutional variables
Sample: 1987 2010
Mean by AC
expenditure 
responsib. 
index fcor_8796 fcor_9701 fcor_0208 fcor_0910
relative 
resources 
index
nacionalist 
president
left-w ing 
president
% nationalist 
seats
% left-w ing 
seats
electoral 
cycle aligned
budget 
consolid. 
scenarios
budget 
stability act 
2001
budget 
stability act 
2006
and 140 0 19 26 39 100 0 100 4 65 25 67 42 21 17
ara 60 0 58 37 52 116 29 54 24 47 25 46 42 21 17
ast 58 0 73 32 47 102 0 83 2 57 25 75 42 21 17
bal 63 0 66 46 52 89 0 33 16 45 25 33 42 21 17
can 117 0 32 28 40 108 71 13 38 36 25 8 42 21 17
cant 60 0 51 31 48 111 63 0 26 34 25 33 42 21 17
cat 140 0 58 52 63 96 71 29 57 47 29 0 42 21 17
cll 58 0 45 27 41 122 0 0 2 39 25 33 42 21 17
clm 58 0 25 23 38 112 0 100 0 56 25 67 42 21 17
ext 58 0 17 16 28 124 0 100 1 59 25 67 42 21 17
gal 127 0 26 25 38 111 0 29 18 45 25 63 42 21 17
mad 60 0 89 71 81 85 0 33 0 49 25 67 42 21 17
mur 60 0 65 29 41 87 0 33 0 46 25 67 42 21 17
nav 130 50 50 50 50 165 75 25 66 51 25 21 42 21 17
pb 140 50 50 50 50 165 92 8 59 42 25 8 42 21 17
rio 60 0 52 33 46 120 0 17 6 43 25 50 42 21 17
val 137 0 49 40 49 88 0 33 11 53 25 67 42 21 17
mean (unw eighted) 90 6 49 36 47 112 24 41 19 48 25 45 42 21 17
median 140 0 0 0 0 110 0 0 10 47 0 0 0 0 0
maximum 140 50 113 73 83 165 100 100 72 76 100 100 100 100 100
minimum 0 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0
std. dev. 64 11 22 18 13 24 42 49 22 10 43 50 49 41 37
skew ness -1 4 2 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2
kurtosis 1 18 8 4 14 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 1 3 4
jarque-bera 63 5245 693 175 2768 62 109 68 73 4 97 68 68 140 242
probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: mean of fcor (f iscal corresponsibility index) corresponds to indicated periods.  
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
Table A5. Fiscal corresponsibility indicator (% of AC fiscal resources subject to change)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
and 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
ara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5
ast 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
bal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5
can 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
cant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4
cat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6
cll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
clm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
ext 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
gal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
mad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
mur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
nav 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
pb 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
rio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4
val 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Source: own elaboration from definitive data of ACs financing system.
Table A6. Relative resources index from AC financing system (per capita index)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
and 103 103 101 102 102 102 102 98 100 102 100 97 96 95 94 100 101 101 102 102 102 100 92 95
ara 116 115 116 113 113 126 123 121 122 121 119 119 109 115 110 113 115 115 115 116 115 115 110 113
ast 101 99 99 98 100 90 92 98 96 97 94 94 97 87 99 111 113 113 113 113 115 117 109 113
bal 100 101 103 102 100 77 83 92 90 78 87 100 83 86 89 86 85 85 82 81 79 77 99 100
can 119 119 117 115 114 120 121 120 116 115 114 116 113 113 111 98 97 96 95 96 97 94 87 89
cant 110 119 108 107 106 103 103 133 104 83 103 102 106 111 106 115 116 116 117 117 117 117 118 123
cat 88 90 92 90 90 97 96 96 98 97 100 101 102 102 103 97 96 96 95 94 94 96 102 99
cll 118 117 117 118 118 133 130 130 130 130 127 128 133 127 123 116 118 118 119 119 120 120 112 117
clm 121 117 120 121 120 128 127 124 124 101 105 104 107 99 110 109 110 109 109 109 109 106 102 104
ext 129 120 124 128 127 135 135 134 134 120 116 117 120 115 123 121 123 123 124 125 126 124 112 119
gal 96 101 102 107 108 110 110 111 111 111 110 112 116 117 119 111 112 113 114 114 115 115 107 112
mad 92 90 89 90 90 70 71 66 71 86 84 83 83 84 82 88 87 87 87 89 89 93 102 94
mur 95 97 100 99 99 67 72 78 74 77 75 73 75 97 91 92 92 91 92 91 91 89 94 93
nav 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
pb 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
rio 118 116 114 119 119 141 133 140 130 106 122 121 114 122 116 119 119 119 117 117 117 118 111 118
val 82 84 82 80 79 87 88 93 89 89 88 88 89 89 89 92 91 91 91 90 89 87 93 94
Source: own elaboration from definitive data of AC financing system.  
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in first differences
Source:
og Spain: European Commission.
og EU5: own elaboration from European Commission.
og AC: own elaboration from De la Fuente (2010; data used in the empirical analysis).
ug AC: own elaboration from INE (data used in the empirical analysis).
Figure A2. ACs primary budget balance and Spanish / EU5 cyclical position
in levels
Notes: output gap of the biggest 5 Spanish export markets - weighted by their export shares- is used as an 
instrument of Acs unemployment and output gap.
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Table A7. Descripte statistics by subperiods
d(ug) primary bb
primary bb / 
d(ug) d(ug) primary bb debt
primary bb / 
d(ug) d(ug) primary bb debt
primary bb / 
d(ug) d(ug) primary bb debt
primary bb / 
d(ug)
and -1,2 -0,9 0,70 2,0 -0,9 6,4 -0,42 -1,5 0,7 7,4 -0,47 5,1 -1,3 6,9 -0,26 
ara -1,6 0,2 -0,15 1,8 -1,1 3,5 -0,61 -0,8 0,1 4,5 -0,09 3,2 -1,5 6,4 -0,48 
ast -0,4 -0,3 0,67 0,8 -0,3 3,3 -0,42 -0,7 0,1 4,2 -0,15 2,5 -0,9 5,1 -0,37 
bal -0,9 -0,3 0,29 1,7 -0,2 2,8 -0,11 -0,8 0,1 4,3 -0,12 4,5 -3,0 12,3 -0,68 
can -0,8 0,1 -0,13 0,7 -0,4 3,8 -0,63 -1,1 0,1 4,0 -0,12 6,1 -1,2 6,0 -0,19 
cant -0,3 -1,0 2,93 1,4 1,3 5,8 0,93 -1,2 0,4 3,3 -0,34 2,7 -1,7 5,3 -0,62 
cat -2,2 -0,2 0,07 2,1 -0,7 5,1 -0,32 -1,1 0,3 8,4 -0,25 3,7 -2,1 12,8 -0,55 
cll -0,7 0,2 -0,30 1,3 -0,5 2,3 -0,36 -0,9 0,2 3,3 -0,17 2,9 -1,3 5,9 -0,45 
clm -0,6 0,4 -0,72 1,3 -0,5 2,3 -0,37 -0,7 -0,2 3,4 0,21 4,5 -3,9 11,4 -0,86 
ext -0,9 0,5 -0,52 1,2 -0,9 5,1 -0,76 -1,0 0,6 5,8 -0,61 3,3 -1,5 6,9 -0,45 
gal -0,4 -0,5 1,32 1,7 -1,3 7,3 -0,77 -0,8 0,5 8,4 -0,58 2,6 -0,8 8,9 -0,30 
mad -1,8 -0,3 0,16 1,7 -0,2 3,1 -0,13 -0,8 0,3 5,2 -0,35 3,3 -0,4 6,2 -0,11 
mur -1,0 -0,3 0,31 2,2 -0,1 5,7 -0,02 -1,3 0,5 3,9 -0,38 5,3 -2,4 5,1 -0,46 
nav -1,6 1,8 -1,14 0,6 -2,7 7,1 -4,44 -0,7 1,1 6,2 -1,64 2,4 -1,9 6,6 -0,82 
pb 0,1 0,1 1,07 0,7 -0,1 5,2 -0,10 -0,6 1,0 4,5 -1,75 1,5 -2,6 4,2 -1,73 
rio -1,9 0,1 -0,05 1,7 -0,3 3,9 -0,15 -0,7 -0,2 3,1 0,27 2,9 -1,7 6,9 -0,60 
val -1,4 0,1 -0,11 2,4 -0,9 5,2 -0,37 -1,1 -0,1 9,6 0,07 4,8 -1,3 14,8 -0,27 
mean 
(unweighted)
-1,0 0,0 -0,00 1,5 -0,6 4,6 -0,38 -0,9 0,3 5,3 -0,35 3,6 -1,7 7,8 -0,48 
d(og) primary bb
primary bb / 
d(og) d(og) primary bb debt
primary bb / 
d(og) d(og) primary bb debt
primary bb / 
d(og) d(og) primary bb debt
primary bb / 
d(og)
and 2,8 -0,9 -0,31 -1,7 -0,5 7,1 0,31 0,8 0,8 7,3 0,96 -2,0 -1,3 6,9 0,64
ara 2,1 0,2 0,11 -1,0 -0,7 3,9 0,71 0,7 0,1 4,5 0,11 -2,0 -1,5 6,4 0,76
ast 1,4 -0,3 -0,20 -0,7 -0,1 3,5 0,19 0,7 0,1 4,3 0,13 -1,9 -0,9 5,1 0,48
bal 1,6 -0,3 -0,17 -1,1 -0,0 3,0 0,00 0,6 0,0 4,4 0,06 -1,7 -3,0 12,3 1,76
can 1,5 0,1 0,07 -1,0 -0,5 4,3 0,50 0,7 0,3 3,8 0,36 -2,1 -1,2 6,0 0,56
cant 1,8 -1,0 -0,54 -1,1 1,2 4,8 -1,17 0,7 0,3 3,3 0,35 -1,8 -1,7 5,3 0,92
cat 2,3 -0,2 -0,07 -0,9 -0,4 6,5 0,44 0,6 0,3 8,3 0,52 -1,8 -2,1 12,8 1,13
cll 1,5 0,2 0,14 -0,6 -0,3 2,6 0,53 0,5 0,2 3,4 0,39 -1,4 -1,3 5,9 0,89
clm 2,6 0,4 0,17 -1,3 -0,4 2,5 0,29 0,7 -0,2 3,5 -0,23 -2,0 -3,9 11,4 1,94
ext 2,1 0,5 0,23 -1,3 -0,4 5,5 0,34 0,8 0,6 5,7 0,78 -1,5 -1,5 6,9 0,97
gal 1,9 -0,5 -0,25 -0,7 -0,8 7,9 1,19 0,6 0,5 8,3 0,96 -1,5 -0,8 8,9 0,51
mad 2,4 -0,3 -0,12 -1,5 -0,2 3,4 0,10 0,8 0,4 5,4 0,45 -1,6 -0,4 6,2 0,23
mur 2,9 -0,3 -0,10 -2,0 0,1 5,5 -0,07 1,0 0,5 3,7 0,49 -2,0 -2,4 5,1 1,18
nav 1,5 1,8 1,26 -0,9 -1,5 8,3 1,63 0,6 1,1 5,5 1,83 -1,4 -1,9 6,6 1,43
pb 2,1 0,1 0,06 -1,5 0,1 6,2 -0,04 0,8 1,1 3,9 1,37 -1,6 -2,6 4,2 1,59
rio 1,9 0,1 0,05 -1,0 -0,0 3,8 0,01 0,7 -0,3 3,0 -0,41 -1,9 -1,7 6,9 0,88
val 2,6 0,1 0,06 -1,7 -0,8 5,9 0,43 1,0 0,0 10,1 0,00 -2,4 -1,3 14,8 0,54
mean 
(unweighted)
2,0 0,0 0,00 -1,2 -0,3 5,0 0,26 0,7 0,3 5,2 0,47 -1,8 -1,7 7,8 0,95
1987-1990 1991-1996 1997-2007 2008-2010
1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-2007 2008-2010
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Table A8. ACs fiscal reaction function with output gap as cyclical conditions variable
Dependent variable: Primary budget balance / GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant term 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01
(-0.09) (-1.18) (0.64) (1.70)* (-0.02) (1.99)** (-3.24)*** (-5.09)*** (-2.75)*** (-3.43)***
d (og) 0,06 0,19 0,18 0,18 0,19 0,19 0,13 0,20
(4.1)*** (7.07)*** (6.03)*** (8.65)*** (6.38)*** (8.34)*** (3.68)*** (5.45)***
d (og) positive 0,04 0,07
(1.73)* (1.10)
d (og) negative 0,08 0,29
(3.30)*** (5.30)***
d(og) * foral AC 0,35
(8.24)***
d(og) * uniprovincial AC -0,14
(-9.98)***
d(og) * left-wing president 0,04
(1.89)*
Primary Budget Balance
/ GDP (-1) 0,55 0,51 0,55 0,52 0,50 0,62 0,50 0,47 0,59 0,33
(13.73)*** (13.8)*** (13.72)*** (13.77)*** (17.25)*** (26.95)*** (13.10)*** (13.19)*** (13.92)*** (6.98)***
Index of expenditure responsibilities
(x 1000) -0,91 -0,83 -0,91 -0,90 -1,23 -2,44 -1,35 -1,54 -0,85 -1,01
(-4.23)*** (-4.31)*** (-4.16)*** (-4.31)*** (-6.18)*** (-7.97)*** (-5.01)*** (-5.3)*** (-2.35)** (-3.18)***
Electoral Cycle (-1) (dummy) (x1000) -0,91 -0,96 -0,95 -1,13 -1,14 -1,95 -0,95 -0,89 -1,20 -1,39
(-3.08)*** (-3.29)*** (-3.20)*** (-3.67)*** (-3.97)*** (-7.17)*** (-3.11)*** (-2.72)*** (-3.04)*** (-3.66)***
Aligned  (dummy) (x1000) 0,01 -0,06
(0.02) (-0.14)
Debt (-1) 0,03
(6.72)***
% of left-wing seats (x1000) 6,00 5,97 6,19 4,45
(2.87)*** (2.96)*** (2.50)** (2.16)**
% of nationalist seats (x1000) 3,88 3,79 3,45 3,02
(4.25)*** (4.35)*** (3.25)*** (3.11)***
Nationalist president (dummy) (x1000) 0,55
(1.56)
Left-wing president (dummy) (x1000) -1,21
(-3.35)***
Fiscal corresponsibility 1987-2001 (x1000) -0,05 1,01
(-0.05) (1.22)
Fiscal corresponsibility 2002- (x1000) -3,12 4,12
(-2.37)** (3.17)***
Index of relative fiscal resources (x1000) 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04
(2.08)** (2.33)** (1.81)* (2.50)**
Budget Consolidation Scenarios
(dummy) (X1000) 6,38
(6.92)***
Budget Stability Act 2001
(dummy) (X1000) 7,38
(7.17)***
Budget Stability Act 2006
(dummy) (X1000) -1,19
(-1.03)
Number of observations 408 408 408 408 306 408 408 408 360 330
Sample 87-10 87-10 87-10 87-10 93-10 87-10 87-10 87-10 87-10 87-08
Adjusted R2 0,47 0,51 0,46 0,48 0,73 0,81 0,53 0,65 0,44 0,37
Estimation method OLS IV OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Hausman exogeneity test
Chi2 (5)  (p-value) -3,09 -35,69
Shea partial R2
d (og) 0,28
d (og) positive 0,14
d (og) negative 0,19
Notes: all regressions are estimated by Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR weights).
*** signification at 99% & ** 95% & * 90%. t-statistics are reported between parentheses.
Shea R-square above 0.10 is generally regarded as support of predictive power.
Output gap of the biggest 5 Spanish export markets - weighted by their export shares- is used as an instrument of ACs output gap.
all ACs common regime ACs
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Figure A3. Budget balance (national accounts data) versus primary budget 
balance (budgetary data)  
Sample: 2003 2010 
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Source: Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.
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A3. Definition of the variables and data source 
 
Alignedit = 1 if the incumbent party (or the party leading the incumbent coalition) in the regional 
government is the same as the incumbent party in the central government (or the party leading 
the incumbent coalition), and 0 otherwise. 
Source: own calculation from http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html 
 
Budget Consolidation Scenariosit = 1 for period 1992-2001 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Budget Stability Act 2001it = 1 for period 2002-2006 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Budget Stability Act 2006it = 1 for period 2007-2011 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Debtit = Regional public debt pc of region i in period t. Source: Bank of Spain. 
 
Electoral cycleit = 1 if t is an election year in region i and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Ministerio del Interior. 
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/OtraInformacion/listado_elecciones_fe.html 
 
Foralit = 1 for Basque Country and Navarra and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Index of expenditure responsibilitiesit = Increase in regional expenditures needs due to the 
assignment of the provision of health and/or education. Source: Sorribas (2011) “The main 
difference across regions in expenditure responsibilities is in responsibility for the provision of 
health care and education at different points in time. These differences are captured by an 
Expenditure responsibilityit index that proxies the increase in regional expenditure needs due to 
the assignment of the provision of health care and/or education. This index is computed on the 
basis of two dummy variables, health careit and educationit, which are equal to one if a regioni is 
responsible for providing health care and/or education in year t and zero otherwise. This index is 
computed as follows: 
  
IERit = (HitEH + EDitEEd)/ CE 
  
where Hit and EDit are dummy variables that are equal to one if the regioni has been assigned 
the provision of health or education, respectively, in period t; EH=564.67€; EEd=428.05€; 
CE=714.48€ is the average per capita expenditure, at 2001 constant prices, during the period 
1986–2001 on health, education, and on the provision of the public goods and services that are 
assigned to all regions, respectively. Hence, IERit is equal to 0 if the region has not been 
assigned health neither education; is equal to 0.8 (0.6) if it is responsible for providing health 
(education); and, is equal to 1.4 if it is responsible for providing health and education”. 
 
Fiscal corresponsibilityit = proportion of ACs Funding System resources which can be 
changed. Therefore, we exclude VAT and the main excise taxes. Foral Regime fiscal 
corresponsibility is supposed to be constant across the period. Our estimates for the Foral 
System (based on 2005 and 2006 data) suggest that this ratio is around 0.5. Source: own 
elaboration based on definitive data of ACs Funding System. Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Administraciones Públicas. 
 
The fiscal corresponsibility indicator is splitted into two variables which take the value of the 
mentioned indicator for the corresponding period (1997-2001 and 2002-2010), and 0 otherwise. 
This separation is necessary as changes in expenditure responsibilities make this indicator not 
homogenous across the sample. 
 
Index of relative fiscal resourcesit = index of ACs relative resources from ACs Funding 
System. We use Zubiri (2003) and De la Fuente (2010) estimates to infer Basque Country and 
Navarra relative resources. As an approximation we suppose that Foral Regime ACs obtain 
65% more per capita resources than the average Common Regime AC. Source: own 
elaboration based on definitive data of ACs Funding System. Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Administraciones Públicas. 
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Left presidentit = 1 if the president of the region i in period t belongs to a left-wing party and 0 
otherwise. If t is an election year and there is a change in the executive power in region i we 
assign that year to the party which has spent more time as an incumbent. 
Source: own elaboration based on http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/spain2.htm 
 
Left-wing seatsit = number of left-wing seats / total seats. Source: own calculation from 
http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html 
 
Nationalist presidentit = 1 if the president of the region i in period t belongs to a nationalist 
party and 0 otherwise. Our definition of nationalist parties captures those parliamentary groups 
that do not contest the elections in all ACs. 
Source: own elaboration based on http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/spain2.htm 
 
Nationalist seatsit = number of nationalist seats / total seats. Our definition of nationalist party 
captures those parliamentary groups that do not contest the elections in all ACs.  
Source: own calculation from http://www.pre.gva.es/argos/archivo/index.html 
 
Output gapit = output gap is the deviation of the actual from the trend real GDP, which is 
estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with lambda 100. Homogeneous series of gross valued 
added at constant prices constructed by de la Fuente (2010) are used in order to overcome 
statistical problems related to statistical methodological changes of national accounts bases. In 
addition, we use official forecasts for the Spanish economy until 2016 (from European 
Commission and International Monetary Fund), in order to minimize the end-point bias related to 
HP filter. 
 
Primary budget balanceit = (non financial revenue – non financial primary expenditure) / GDP. 
Source: Liquidación de Presupuestos de las Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas. Ministerio 
de Economía y Hacienda. 
 
Unemployment gapit = unemployment gap is the deviation of the actual unemployment rate 
from the average unemployment rate over the period 1977-2011. Source: EPA. INE. 
  
Uniprovincialit = 1 for uniprovincial ACs and 0 otherwise. 
 
